As the situation for the Continental Army began to deteriorate to a point of near crisis, Washington started to consider the possibility of setting up his army in winter quarters. However, the location had to meet certain criteria. Namely, it had to allow the army to rebuild and train while being close enough to observe British activities in and around Philadelphia. With this in mind, Washington called councils of war on the 24th and 30th of November 1777 to determine the best location for winter quarters. Two options being floated at the time were Wilmington, DE and in the vicinity of Lancaster, PA. His generals responded overwhelmingly in favor of setting up winter quarters, but disagreed about the best location. Following the actions at White Marsh and the subsequent British retirement back to their lines, the decision was made to move to Valley Forge. Hence the army began crossing the Schuylkill River on the 9th of December and arrived at their winter quarters on the 20th. The army would remain there until the 19th of June 1778.

From the beginning, Washington would have to defend his decision to over winter at Valley Forge. Concerns about the Continental Army’s ability to defend New Jersey and Wilmington, DE from British sorties were the main concerns raised by dissenters. They wanted the army split up so that all regions within reach of the British could in theory be defended. However, Washington argued that the army could not provide security to everyone, especially considering that it was in no condition to fight when it entered Valley Forge. He reasoned that he “determined to take post near this place, as the best calculated in my Judgement to secure the Army—to protect our Stores and cover the Country; and for this purpose we are beginning to hut, and shall endeavour to accomplish it as expeditiously as possible.” One day after the army’s arrival at Valley Forge, the men were ordered to begin construction of the huts that would become their winter homes.

Not only did Washington face dissent about the location of the Valley Forge cantonment, his ability to command was being scrutinized as well. Questions about his suitability had surfaced following the disastrous Philadelphia campaign and the American victory at Saratoga. So, after the army settled into their winter quarters constructing huts, Washington set to work defending his fitness for command by reorganizing the army into an effective fighting force. The Continental Army had shown that it could conduct offensive operations and be viable force against British and Hessian Regulars, but Washington envisioned an army that would not only stand up to, but would defeat her European foes.

On the 1st of January 1778, Washington attempted his first reorganization of the army. This “Arrangement of the Army for the Campaign 1778—& present state of the Battalions” would not come to fruition, but it would show that Washington was willing to make the changes he thought necessary to increase the efficacy of the army. Had this arrangement gone into effect, Grayson’s would have moved out of Scott’s Brigade into an unnamed brigade in General Stirling’s Division. Instead, Grayson’s Regiment would remain in Scott’s Brigade, now in the Marquis de Lafayette’s Division throughout the army’s stay at Valley Forge.

This first reorganization attempt revealed that Washington planned to consolidate his existing forces while developing methods for filling the ranks of the remaining units. In early January 1778, the Congress would step in the process by creating the Continental Congress Camp Committee, which was authorized to work with the Commander-in-Chief to reform the army. By the end of January, Washington wrote a comprehensive plan for reforming all components of the Continental Army. Among other things, this plan included a system of one-year conscription to raise the necessary men to fill the state levies. While this may have resolved the recruiting problem for the states, Washington was “at a loss what to propose, concerning the German battalion, Hazen’s regiment and the sixteen additionals.” He recommended that the additional regiments be reduced to nine because of their being “tolerably respectable, and hav[ing] undergone a good deal of hard service in the course of the last campaign.”

Coupled with the French alliance, these reforms proposed by Washington would have a dramatic impact on the army in regards to its ability to fight the British on equal terms and to merely survive. Along with the conscription and reorganization proposals, Washington also requested reform to the pension and promotion system for officers; to the Clothier General Quartermaster General, Commissary, Hospital, Pay Master, Artillery, and Engineering Departments; and the Auditors of Accounts. The Congress’ responses to these proposals were generally slow and Washington did not get everything he requested in the manner he sought. This, however, did not stop him from moving forward with the reforms while the army was at Valley Forge. While most of these reforms impacted most of the army indirectly there were some that had a direct effect on the army as a whole to include Grayson’s Regiment. One of those improvements was the institution of a uniform system of drill.

Washington’s plan also proposed the creation of the Inspector General’s office with the express “purpose of instituting and carrying into practice, an uniform system of manual and maneuvers” in order to “superintend[], the practice of the rules laid down, throughout the army”. He would also request that each brigade would have an assistant inspector general to help standardize a system of battlefield drill that could be used throughout the army. However, as with many of his proposals, the Congress was slow to act if they acted at all. Frustrated by congressional inaction and seeing the urgent need for a consistent method of discipline for the army, Washington put his plan into action on the 19th of March 1778 without gaining formal approval from the Continental Congress. He ordered the creation of “Sub-Inspectors” at the division level and “Brigade-Inspectors” at the brigade level. These inspectors would “form a well organised Body of Instructors” that could provide a training cadre to instruct the men in the manual of arms. He also informally appointed Prussian Baron Freidrich Wilhelm von Steuben to the post of inspector General the same day. Von Steuben set to work writing a drill manual and instructing officers of the various brigades and by early May, a system of training was mandated for the entire army. These actions by the Commander-in-Chief would go a long way in establishing the Continental Army as a legitimate fighting force, which would be demonstrated a few months later at Monmouth Court-House.

Clothing the army had always been a problem for Washington and this issue had reached the point of near crisis in the waning days of the Philadelphia Campaign and during the cantonment at Valley Forge. Due to the shortage of the raw materials and skilled tradesmen to make uniforms, officers resorted to “employ[ing] Agents to purchase up what could be found in different parts of the country.” Realizing that this system would not do for a regular force in the field, Washington laid out a plan to the Camp Committee for a relatively inexpensive means to uniform the army. His plan called for uniform issues twice a year, in June and January. He also recommended a “new fashion” for regimental coats. The new uniform issue read as follows:

“In June should be given a waistcoat with sleeves, flannel, if to be had, two pair of linnen overalls, one shirt, a black stock of hair, or leather, a small round hat bound and a pair of shoes. In January, a waistcoat to be worn over the former, close in the skirts and double breasted, resembling [ ], to have a collar and cuff of a different color, in order to distinguish the regiment, a pair of breeches, woolen overalls, yarn stockings, shirt, woolen cap, and a blanket when really necessary. Watch coats ought, if possible, to be provided for sentinels. Whatever might be furnished more than these, the soldier ought to have stopped out of his pay, upon the terms fixed by Congress, in their late resolve.”

Congress vacillated on granting Washington’s uniform requests and it would take until 1779 before a standard would be in place. However, his did not stop Washington from moving forward with his plans. Even before he wrote the letter to the Camp Committee, he ordered Clothier General Mease to adhere to the “new fashion” for regimental coats. Mease chose to defy Washington’s orders which undoubtedly contributed to being fired by Congress later in the year. He also asked Governor John Trumbull of Connecticut to have coats cut in the “new fashion.”

Since they were not affiliated with a state, Washington stipulated the uniform standard for the “sixteen additionals” and that they would be supplied solely from “Continental stock.” On the 3rd of April 1778, Washington wrote to Mease to inform him that “[t]he officer who will deliver you this is sent by Colo. Grayson for the purpose of getting cloaths for his Regiment – by him you will receive a Copy of the Genl order, in which my desire of furnishing all those Corps not appertaining to any particular State is expressed.”

To be Continued…